# 5 = Volume 2, Part 1 = March 1975
Fredric Jameson
After Armageddon: Character Systems in Dr. Bloodmoney
Dick's voluminous work can be seen as falling into various distinct thematic
groups or cycles: there is, for instance, the early Vanvogtian game-playing
cycle, the Nazi cycle (e.g. The Man in the High Castle, The
Unteleported Man), a relatively minor Jungian cycle (of which the best
effort is undoubtedly Galactic Pot-Healer), and, of course, the late
"metaphysical" cycle which includes his most striking novels, Ubik
and The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch. In such a view, Dr.
Bloodmoney (1965) can be assigned to a small but crucial middle group of
eschatological novels, along with its less successful companion-piece, The
Simulacra. In these two works, for the first time, there emerges that
bewildering and kaleidoscopic plot structure we associate with Dick's mature
production. At the same time, this cycle helps us to understand the origins and
the function of this sudden and alarming proliferation of sub-plots, minor
characters, and exuberantly episodic digressions, for both of these works
dramatize the utopian purgation of a fallen and historically corrupted world by
some final climactic overloading, some ultimate explosion beyond which the
outlines of a new and simpler social order emerge. But in the two cases the
"coding" of the evil, as well as its exorcism, is different: in The
Simulacra, this is political and economic, and it is a big-corporation but
also entertainment-industry-type power elite which invites purgation, while in Dr.
Bloodmoney the historical crisis is expressed in terms of the familiar
counterculture denunciation of an evil or perverted science (compare Vonnegut in
Cat's Cradle), only too emblematically exposed by the invention of the
atomic bomb.
In this particular book, indeed, for the first and last time in the Dick
canon, we are given to witness an event which serves in one way or another as
the precondition and the premise of other books but which already lies in the
past by the time the latter begin: the atomic cataclysm, World War III, the
holocaust from which all the peculiar Dick near-futures spring and in which they
find their historical sustenance. Here alone are we able to see the bombs
actually fall and the towers topple; indeed, an untypical flashback isolates the
moment itself and draws our attention to it with hallucinatory intensity. So we
would want to ask, at the outset, why such a vision of catastrophe, on which
other SF writers have not shown the same reluctance to dwell, should be so
infrequently represented by a writer not otherwise known for his squeamishness;
or, to reverse the order of priorities, what in the construction of Dr.
Bloodmoney enables it to present this vision.
In the context of Dick's world, for his aesthetic and the narrative line that
is so unmistakably his own, the raw material of atomic destruction presents
artistic problems unlike any other, problems of a delicate and strategic kind,
that involve the very scaffolding of Dick's novelistic construction. Nowhere
else, indeed, is the fundamental ambivalence of his imagination revealed so
clearly, an ambivalence which is however the very source of his strength
elsewhere and the formative mechanism of his invention. For the point about the
atomic cataclysm in Dr. Bloodmoney is not merely that Bluthgeld takes it
to be a projection of his own psychic powers, but that, as the book continues,
we are ourselves less and less able to distinguish between what I am forced to
call "real" explosions, and those that take place within the psyche.
Every reader of Dick is familiar with this nightmarish uncertainty, this reality
fluctuation, sometimes accounted for by drugs, sometimes by schizophrenia, and
sometimes by new SF powers, in which the psychic world as it were goes outside,
and reappears in the form of simulacra or of some photographically cunning
reproduction of the external. In general, the effect of these passages, in which
the narrative line comes unstuck from its referent and begins to enjoy the
bewildering autonomy of a kind of temporal Moebius strip, is to efface the
boundary between real and hallucinatory altogether, and to discredit the
reader's otherwise inevitable question as to which of the events witnessed is to
be considered "true."
In such moments, Dick's work transcends the opposition between the subjective
and the objective, and thereby confronts the dilemma which in one way or another
characterizes all modern literature of any consequence: the intolerable and yet
unavoidable choice between a literature of the self and a language of some
impersonal exteriority, between the subjectivism of private languages and case
histories, or some nostalgia for the objective that leads outside the realm of
individual or existential experience into some reassuringly stable place of
common sense and statistics. Dick's force lies in the effort to retain
possession and use of both apparently contradictory, mutually exclusive
subjective and objective explanation systems all at once. The causal
attribution, then, of the hallucinatory experiences to drugs, to schizophrenia
or to the half-life, is not so much a concession to the demands of the older
kind of reading for explanation as it is a refusal of that first, now archaic
solution of symbolism and modernism—the sheer fantasy and dream narrative. To
attribute his nightmares to drugs, schizophrenia or half-life is thus a way of
affirming their reality and rescuing their intolerable experiences from being
defused as an unthreatening surrealism; a way of preserving the resistence and
the density of the subjective moment, of emphasizing the commitment of his work
to this very alternation itself as its basic content. And this discontinuity is
at one with our fragmented existence under capitalism; it dramatizes our
simultaneous presence in the separate compartments of private and public worlds,
our twin condemnation to both history and psychology in scandalous concurrence.
Now, however, it becomes apparent what is unique about the atomic blast as a
literary event in such a world: for with it the question about the referent,
about the truth value of the narrative, returns in force. It becomes impossible
for Dick to do what he is able to do elsewhere: to prevent the reestablishment
of the reality principle and the reconstitution of experience into the twin
airtight domains of the objective and the subjective. For unlike the time warps
and the time sags, the hallucinations and the four-dimensional mirages of the
other books, atomic holocaust is a collective event about whose reality the
reader cannot but decide. Dick's narrative ambiguity can accommodate individual
experience, but runs greater risks in evoking the materials of world history,
the flat yes or no of the mushroom cloud. And behind this
difficulty, perhaps, lies the feeling that America itself and its institutions
are so massively in place, so unshakeable, so unchangeable (save by total
destruction), that the partial modification available in private life through
drugs and analogous devices is here unconvincing and ineffectual. How, then,
does Dr. Bloodmoney manage to assimilate something which apparently by
definition lies outside the range of Dick's aesthetic possibilities?
THE OVERALL PLOT OF THE NOVEL is rather conventional: we follow several
survivors of the blast in their various post-atomic adventures which all appear
to reach some climax in the death of Bluthgeld, and which all have a kind of
coda in the return to Berkeley as to a gradual reemergence of civilization. Yet
it seems to me that the content of the individual adventures, and the detail of
the novel, cannot really be understood until we become aware of the operative
presence within it of a certain number of systems of which the surface
events are now seen as so many combinations and articulations.
Chief among these, as is so often the case in non-realistic narratives,
narratives not dependent on common sense presuppositions and habituated
perceptions, is that formed by a whole constellation of peculiar characters.
The revelation—made in passing, without any great flourishes—that the
initial point-of-view figure (Stuart) happens to be a Negro has the function of
staging the appearance of the first really unusual figure—the thalidomide cul-de-jatte
or phocomelus Hoppy Harrington—in the still fairly "realistic" and
everyday perspective of social stigma: both work for a businessman who prides
himself on providing jobs for people otherwise excluded from the normal white
American society with which we are all familiar. It is only later on, after the
bomb blast, that the real mutants begin to flourish; yet it seems to me that
these opening pages have the function of slowly beginning to separate us from
our ordinary characterology, and of deprogramming our typological reactions,
preparing us for a narrative space in which new and unfamiliar systems of
classifying characters can operate at full throttle, unimpeded by cultural and
personal presuppositions on the part of the reader.
A first hint that these various characters do not exist as mere isolated
curiosities, as unrelated monsters of various kinds, is provided by the fate of
the "first man on Mars," immobilized in eternal orbit by the outbreak
of the war and circling Earth henceforth as a kind of celestial vaguely leftist
disk jockey whose task it is to provide a communications relay between the
stricken areas over which he passes, and otherwise to play hours of taped music
and read aloud the few available surviving texts—Somerset Maugham's Of
Human Bondage, for instance—which remain of the cultural patrimony at the
dawn of these new dark ages. Dangerfield is, of course, a more or less ordinary
human being, yet aspects of his situation slowly—and improbably—begin to
impose an analogy with Hoppy's. Consider, for instance, Stuart's reflexion on
the latter character: "Now, of course, one say many phoces, and almost all
of them on their 'mobiles', exactly as Hoppy had been, placed dead center each
in his own little universe, like an armless, legless god" (§8). This image
might also characterize Dangerfield's sacred isolation as he circles the earth;
but a childhood memory of Hoppy's reinforces the parallel: "'One time a ram
butted me and flew through the air. Like a ball.'... They all laughed, now,
himself and Fergesson and the two repairmen; they imagined how it looked, Hoppy
Harrington, seven years old, with no arms and legs, only a torso and a head,
rolling over the ground, howling with fright and pain—but it was funny; he
knew it" (§2). This power of Hoppy's to project bodies into the air like
soccer balls later becomes lethal (the death of Bluthgeld), but it suggests a
kinesthetic affinity for Dangerfield's fate as well—the live being housed in a
cylindrical unit soaring through empty space. And when it is remembered that
this plot-line reaches its climax in Hoppy's attempt to substitute himself,
through his own voice and powers of mimicry, for the ailing Dangerfield, the
analogy between the two positions becomes unmistakable.
Yet they are not exactly symmetrical. Subsequent events, and the introduction
of newer and even stranger characters, seem to make the point that Hoppy is, if
anything, insufficiently like Dangerfield. At this stage, indeed, in the
increasing post-atomic prosperity of the West Marin collective, it is as though
Hoppy, with his complicated prostheses and his remarkable skills in repair and
invention, has become far too active a figure to maintain the analogy with the
imprisoned disk jockey. The episode-producing mechanism of the novel then
produces a new being, a more monstrous and more adequate replica in the form of
the homunculus Bill, carried around inside his sister's body and emitting
messages to her and to others on the outside, but as decisively insulated from
the world as Dangerfield himself.
Indeed, it may be suggested that the entire action of the novel is organized
around this sudden shift in relationships, this sudden rotation of the axis of
the book's characterological system on the introduction of the new being. We may
describe it as a problem of substitutions: Hoppy's error is to believe that he
is Dangerfield's opposite number, and, as such, destined in some way to replace
him. In fact, however, his mission in the plot is quite different, for he is
called upon to eliminate the ominous Bluthgeld, who has not yet figured in our
account and whose anomaly (schizophrenic paranoia) would not seem to be a
physical disability of the type exemplified by Hoppy or Bill, or, by metaphoric
extension, by Dangerfield himself.
But before trying to integrate Bluthgeld into our scheme, let us first
rapidly enumerate the other freaks or anomalous beings that people this
extravagant work. We have omitted, for one thing, the realm of the dead
themselves, to which Bill has special access—"trillions and trillions of
them and they're all different.... Down in the ground" (§10). Here then,
already the half-life world of Ubik is beginning to take shape; yet as
entities the dead are quite distinct from either Bill or Dangerfield in that—equally
isolated—they have no mode of action or influence on the outside world, and
cannot even, as do the former, emit messages to it: "After a point the dead
people down below weren't very interesting because they never did anything, they
just waited around. Some of them, like Mr. Blaine, thought all the time about
killing and others just mooned like vegetables" (§12).
Finally, among the extreme varieties of mutant fauna in the post-atomic
landscape, we must not forget to mention the so-called "brilliant
animals," creatures with speech and organizational ability, like
Bluthgeld's talking dog or the touching subjects of the following anecdotes:
"'Listen, my friend,' the veteran said, 'I got a pet rat lives under the
pilings with me? He's smart; he can play the flute. I'm not putting you under an
illusion, it's true. I made a little wooden flute and he plays it through his
nose.'... 'Let me tell you about a rat I once saw that did a heroic deed,' the
veteran began, but Stuart cut him off" (§8). These gifted animals, indeed,
provide Stuart with his livelihood, the sale of Hardy's Homeostatic Vermin
Traps, mechanical contrivances scarcely less intelligent than the prey they are
designed to hunt down, and which may therefore lay some equal claim to being yet
another variety of new creature.
I will now suggest that all of these beings, taken together, organize
themselves into systematic permutations of a fairly limited complex of ideas or
characteristics which turns around the notion of organism and organs,
of mechanical contrivances, and (in the case of the phocomelus) of prostheses.
But the results of these combinations are a good deal more complicated than a
simple opposition between the organic and the mechanical, and A.J. Greimas's
semantic rectangle1 allows us to map the various possibilities
inherent in the system as follows:
The four self-generating terms of the graph represent the simplest atomic
units of the characterological system of Dr. Bloodmoney. yet it will be
noted that, with the possible exception of S itself (or in other words, of all
the normal human characters in the book), all are in another sense merely
part of the background of the work, providing a kind of strange new living
environment for the action in it, and marking out the life coordinates of this
post-atomic universe, fixing the limits within which the plot will unfold,
without themselves really participating in it. In particular, it will have
become clear that none of the really aberrant characters described above can be
accommodated neatly within any given one of the four basic terms.
Yet the generative capacity of the semantic rectangle is not exhausted with
these four primary elements. On the contrary, its specific mode of conceptual
production is to construct a host of complex entities out of the various new
combinations logically obtainable between the simple terms. These new and more
complicated, synthetic concepts correspond to the various sides of the semantic
rectangle, so that the complex term designates an idea or a phenomenon able to
unite in itself both terms of the initial opposition S and -S, while the neutral
term accordingly governs the negatives of both, a synthesis of the bottom terms -þ
and þ. The respective combinations
of the left-hand and right-hand sides of the rectangle are technically known as
the positive and negative deictic axes. A little experimentation now shows that
these four combinations correspond exactly to the four principal anomalous
characters or actors of the book.
The complex term, for instance, a being which would unite a normal human body
(S) with a machine or mechanical prostheses (-S), can only be Dangerfield
himself, as he circles the Earth forever united to his satellite. The negative
deixis which emerges from the union of a prosthesis with a crippled being (þ,
lacking organs) is of course Hoppy Harrington, the phocomelus. The neutral
presents perhaps greater problems, insofar as it involves the enigmatic fourth
position, -þ, itself the negation
of a negation and thus apparently devoid of any positive content. Yet if we read
this particular term, which is neither an organism not a machine, as something
on the order of a spiritual prosthesis, a kind of supplement to either
organic or mechanical existence which is qualitatively different from either,
then we sense the presence of that familiar realm in Dick's works in which,
under the stimulus of drugs or schizophrenic disorder, vision, second sight,
precognition, hallucination, are all possible. If this reading is accepted, then
the neutral term would be understood as a combination between just such a
spiritual prosthesis or supplementary power and a being lacking organs; and it
becomes clear that what is thus designated can only be the homunculus Bill, with
his access to the realm of the dead and his absence from the world of physical
existence.
Our scheme has the added advantage of allowing us now to integrate Bluthgeld
himself into a more generalized system of anomalous characters. As long as our
basic traits or characteristics were limited to the opposition of organic to
mechanical, the system seemed to bear no particular relevance to the figure of
Bluthgeld. With the idea of spiritual powers, his position with relation to the
other characters is now more easily defined, and it would seem appropriate to
assign him the as yet unfilled function of the so-called positive deixis, or in
other words, the synthesis of S (ordinary human) and -þ
(spiritual prosthesis). Now his privileged relationship to Hoppy Harrington also
becomes comprehensible: to the phocomelus alone will fall the power to destroy
Bluthgeld, because Hoppy is the latter's reverse or mirror-image. (Indeed, their
relationship is still more complicated than this; for in appearance Hoppy is
Bluthgeld's creature, and the other characters believe him to be the genetic
result of the notorious 1972 fall-out catastrophe for which the scientist was
responsible. In reality, however, he is a thalidomide birth from an earlier
period—1964—and owes nothing to the latter, whom he is thus free to
annihilate.)
We may now articulate this new system of combinations as follows:
Not only does this scheme permit us to account for the construction of the
main characters of Dr. Bloodmoney and to understand their relationship to
each other, it provides us with material for grasping their symbol-value as
well, and thus eventually for an interpretation of the bizarre events which the
novel recounts. The systematic arrangement here proposed, for instance, suggests
that the four characters are distinguished by distinct functions or realms of
activity and competency. If for example we take knowledge as a theme, and
interrogate the various positions accordingly, we find that each corresponds to
a different and specific type of cognitive power: Hoppy thus possesses knowledge
about the future as well as a practical kinaesthetic knowledge and control of
inorganic matter; Bill the homunculus possesses (verbal) knowledge about the
dead and kinaesthetic knowledge/control of organic matter. Meanwhile, the final
long-distance psychoanalysis of the ailing Dangerfield suggests that the
particular type of knowledge associated with him is (verbal or theoretical)
knowledge of the past, and he is, of course, the guardian of an almost
annihilated Earthly culture. As for Bluthgeld, his province is surely Knowledge
in general, the theoretical secrets of inorganic matter (and kinaesthetic
control of it), i.e. of the universe itself.
But as we enrich the thematic content of the four positions, it seems
possible to characterize them in a more general way, one which may ultimately
allow us to see them in terms of some basic overriding thematic opposition. So
to each position or combination would seem to correspond a particular type of professional
activity as well: Dangerfield is thus, as we already noted, a kind of
celestial DJ, one version among many of the characteristic Dick entertainment-celebrity,
whose most recent incarnation is the Jason of Flow My Tears, the Policeman
Said. Opposed to this valorization of the word, Hoppy takes his place as an
embodiment of the other characteristic form of creative activity in Dick's
world, namely the practical handyman or artisan-inventor. The other two figures
do not at first glance appear to fit very neatly into this scheme of things;
Bluthgeld is of course the prototypical mad scientist, but more directly, during
the course of the book's action, the psychotic and visionary; while Bill—judging
from the endless conversations carried on with him by his sister Edie, much to
the dismay of her elders—would seem best described as an imaginary playmate.
Still, even these approximations suggest some larger thematic oppositions:
there is a sense in which both Hoppy and Bluthgeld have as their privileged
object the world of things, which they divide up between them along the
traditional and familiar axis of contemplative and active attitudes. Bluthgeld,
whether as a scientist or a madman, sees into the structure of the world in a
contemplative fashion; and this suggests that his great sin was to have passed,
whether voluntarily or inadvertently, from the realm of contemplation to that of
action (the fall-out from the tests of 1972, World War III itself). As for Hoppy,
his knowledge of the future is, like his mechanical skill, simply part of the
equipment necessary for survival; but his increasing psychic powers suggest an
abuse of his particular position not unlike that of Bluthgeld's, and fraught
with similar dangers.
Insofar as he forms a structural pendant to Dangerfield, I am tempted to
describe the homunculus Bill in terms of the well-known axis that information
theory provides between sender and receiver. Bill sends messages also, to be
sure, but in relationship to the realm of the dead his principal function is
surely that of receiving them, that of the absent listener to imaginary
conversations, that open slot which is the function of the interlocutor in all
discourse, even that of absolute solitude. There thus is articulated around the
character of Bill the whole communicational syntax of interpersonal
relationships, so that at this point the vertical axis which includes the
positions of both Bill and Dangerfield seems by its linguistic emphasis quite
sharply distinguished from the other axis which governs the world of objects:
The verbal axis which includes the positions of Bill and Dangerfield is now
seen to be primarily a linguistic one, and sharply distinguished from the
horizontal axis which includes the positions of Bluthgeld and Hoppy and which is
concerned with physics. Furthermore, the vertical Bill-Dangerfield axis is one
of the use of knowledge for community well-being (prefigured in the
"just" killing for the community's sake), whereas the horizontal
Bluthgeld-Hoppy axis is one of the perversion of knowledge or its manipulation
(even literally in the case of Hoppy's "handling" at a distance),
which threatens to destroy the human community. The organic or communicational
Bill-Dangerfield axis bringing together the past and the present, the living and
the dead, is thus the locus and bearer of life-enhancing activities in the
novel, whereas the inorganic or physical Bluthgeld-Hoppy axis is the locus of
individualistic madness which would, if unchecked, certainly enslave and most
probably destroy human life on Earth. Clearly, Dick's solution of the
fundamental politico-existential problems facing humanity is here slanted toward
art and language rather than toward an explicit scientific diagnosis which would
meet the political problem head on. Nonetheless, Dick seems to realize that the
verbal, linguistic or communicational field cannot by itself provide a solution.
The playful character of Bill rises therefore, by his at least approximate
synthesis of verbal and kinaesthetic powers, of communications and active
physical intervention, to the status of final mediator, arbiter and one could
almost say saviour in the microcosm of Dr. Bloodmoney.
WITH THE CHARACTEROLOGICAL SYSTEMS of the book thus revealed, we may now
perhaps attempt a reading of its action as a whole. Briefly, it may be
suggested that the book is organized around two narrative lines, one following
Bluthgeld himself and the people who knew him, the other involving Hoppy
Harrington and his respective acquaintances. The privileged narrator or
"point of view" for the first plot is Bonnie, that of the second
Stuart McConchie. Hence the arrival of Stuart in the West Marin County commune
where Bonnie lives and where Bluthgeld is in hiding serves to trigger off the
explosive interaction between the two plot lines, the lethal encounter between
Hoppy and Bluthgeld, and the final dénouement.
The end or object of the action's development is evidently the neutralization
of the dangerous and sinister Bluthgeld and his removal from the human scene in
general; the complexity of the intrigue results from the difficulty of
accomplishing this. For Bluthgeld is after all seen as the cause, in person, of
World War III; yet this personalized and Manichaean view of history involves us
in some curious conceptual antinomies which the narrative may be seen as a
symbolic attempt to work through. It would seem appropriate, then, here to
follow the example of Lévi-Strauss2 in his analysis of myth as a
narrative construction of symbolic mediations or syntheses whose purpose is the
resolution, in story form, of a contradiction which the culture in question is
unable to solve in reality. In the present context, this contradiction may be
formulated as follows: How can you get rid of the cause of something as
devastating as atomic war, when—in order to function as its cause in the first
place—that ultimate causal determinant must be all-powerful and thus by
definition impossible to get rid of? To put it in terms of the plot, the only
way that an isolated individual like Bluthgeld can be imagined to be the
"cause" of World War III is by endowing him with a power so immense
that it is thereafter impossible to imagine any other power capable of matching
him. If you like, the contradiction is more one inherent in liberal thought than
in reality: if world politics is seen, not as the expression of class and
national politico-economical dynamics which have an inner logic of their own,
but rather as the result of the decisions of free conscious agents, some of whom
are good (us) and some of whom are evil (the enemy, whoever he happens to be),
then it is clear that the problem of the evil adversary's sources of power will
return again and again with a kind of agonizing and incomprehensible
persistence. Like any good American "leftist," of course, Dick sees
the enemy as the American power elite and in particular its nuclear physicists;
yet that point of view, as attractive as it may be, remains a prisoner of the
same basic contradictions as the liberal ideology it imagines itself to be
opposing.
In the novel itself, the solution lies in the development of a counterforce,
an adversary powerful enough to neutralize Bluthgeld's magic and thus to destroy
him. This is Hoppy Harrington's role, and the phocomelus grows in power as the
book continues—objectively because the needs of the new post-atomic community
encourage the growth and diversification of his special talents, and
subjectively insofar as his self-confidence keeps pace with the immense range of
new contrivances and weapons he has been able to evolve (some of them psychic).
Along with this new self-confidence, however, his resentment has intensified as
well. By the time of the confrontation with Bluthgeld, Hoppy is himself a
dangerously paranoid figure, potentially as harmful to the community as the man
he is now able to destroy. Thus a kind of interminable regression is at work
here, in which any adversary powerful enough to blast the evil at its source
becomes then sufficiently dangerous to call forth a nemesis in his own right,
and so forth (see Dick's early novel Vulcan's Hammer). The basic
contradiction, in other words, has not been solved at all, but merely displaced
onto the mechanism devised to remove it, where it continues to function without
any prospect of resolution.
The elegance of Dick's solution to this apparently insoluble dilemma makes of
his novel a kind of textbook illustration of that mechanism which Structuralism
has taken as its privileged object of study and which has seemed to underscore a
basic parallelism between the workings of kinship systems and those of language,
between the rules governing gift-giving in primitive societies and those at work
in the market system, between the mechanisms of political and historical
development and those of plot. This is the phenomenon of exchange, and
nowhere is the flash between contrary poles quite so dramatic as in the moment
in Dr. Bloodmoney when the circle is squared and the mind of the
homunculus substituted for that of the malevolent Hoppy, on the point of taking
over the world: " 'I'm the same; I'm Bill Keller,' the phocomelus said.
'Not Hoppy Harrington.' With his right manual extensor he pointed. 'There's
Hoppy. That's him from now on.'—In the corner lay a shriveled dough-like
object several inches long; its mouth gaped in congealed emptiness. It had a
human-like quality to it, and Stockstill went over to pick it up" (§16).
What makes the exchange possible is the peculiar status of the homunculus's
body, both in and outside the world; Bill was attached to something real, a
foetal body which died rapidly on exposure to the atmosphere; but in another
sense, he was the only one of the four characters to be without a body
and thus able to switch places without the development of an elaborate
counterforce which might then—as in the infinite regression described above—become
a threat in its own right. Hoppy fights Bluthgeld, in other words, on the
latter's own terms, while Bill's replacement of Hoppy amounts to a shift from
that system to a new one; and this is made possible by Hoppy's own violation of
his particular system and powers. For he meant to replace Dangerfield by
mimicry, that is, by the use of a verbal and linguistic skill quite different
from the kinaesthetic one with which he had beaten Bluthgeld. But at this point,
then, he is vulnerable to the superior use of the same purely verbal power by
Bill, who intimidates and demoralizes him by his own use of the voices of the
dead, and then finishes him off by wholesale personality transference—combining
verbal and kinaesthetic power.
The basic shift in question we are now able to understand as a substitution
of one axis for another, of that of Dangerfield and the homunculus for that of
Bluthgeld and Hoppy, of that of language for that of existence—either
practical or contemplative—in the world of objects. The latter axis—the
horizontal one, in our schematic representation above—is of course marked
negatively, both of its extremes being evil or malevolent in terms of the
narrative. It does not, however, follow that the other axis is in contrast
completely positive: in fact, in most of the novel both Bill and Dangerfield are
immobilized or paralyzed. Even at the end, both remain under a depressing
restriction in mobility and human potentialities in general, which serves to
deprive the resolution of the book of tones that might otherwise be complacent
or unacceptably aestheticizing.
For it seems clear that the basic event envisaged by Dr. Bloodmoney is
the substitution of the realm of language for the realm of things, the
replacement of the older compromised world of empirical activity, capitalist
everyday work and scientific knowledge, by that newer one of communication and
of messages of all kinds with which we are only too familiar in this consumer
and service era. In reality, this shift seems to me to contain many negative and
doubtful elements, and to welcome too unqualifiedly developments which are not
necessarily an unmixed blessing. It is of course the very distinctness of these
two axes—itself predicated on the "fact" of atomic war—that allows
the exchange in Dr. Bloodmoney to take place in so striking and exemplary
a fashion. But even in this novel, there is a hint of fusing concern about
language and concern about objects in Bill, so that the exchange solution is
only a provisional one, and relatively unstable. We would want at this point to
return from this novel to Dick's other works in order to determine whether the
priority of language over objects is there maintained. It would seem, for
instance, that in some of the other works (Galactic Pot-Healer, for
example, or most recently Flow My Tears, The Policeman Said),
handicrafts, and particularly pot-making, are understood as a different kind of
synthesis between art and work, developing more explicitly the trend in the
present book.
Our analysis is in any case not complete until we return from this as it were
super-human level of the narrative—the interactions between the various
synthetic or complex terms of the characterological system—to the more
pedestrian reality of the ordinary human characters like Bonnie or Stuart, who
constitute, as we have suggested earlier, merely one simple term among others in
the original system. Now it can be confidently asserted, it seems to me, that
what held for the other simple terms (machines, the dead, the animals) holds
true for the human population of Dr. Bloodmoney as well, namely that they
provide the background and furnish the spectators and onlookers for a drama
largely transcending them in significance. Thus the novel betrays a formal
kinship with earlier works of Dick, such as the deservedly forgotten Cosmic
Puppets, in which ordinary humans are the playthings of cosmic forces of
some mythological type: the difference being that here those forces are not
theological or Jungian in content but correspond to the very realities of modern
history itself (scientific technique on the one hand and the communicational
network on the other).
As far as the ordinary human characters of the book are concerned, then, the
drama enacted not so much above as among them amounts to a purification of
society and its reestablishment, to the rebirth of some new and utopian Berkeley
on the ruins of the old one in whose streets ominous Bluthgelds might have from
time to time been glimpsed (and surely the choice of the site of that dress
rehearsal of May 1968 which was the Free Speech Berkeley of 1963—two years
before the publication of Dick's novel—is no accident and has historical
implications that largely transcend whatever autobiographical motives may also
be involved). To say that the social form to which Dick's work corresponds is
the small town would convey something anachronistic in the present social
context; or at any rate, we should add that it is to be understood as the
university town which never knew the provincialism nor the claustrophobia of the
classical Main Streets of the American Middle West. Nor is Dick's pastoral a
purely agricultural one, like that achieved in a kind of desperate exhilaration
by the survivors of John Wyndham's various universal cataclysms. As different
from him, or from the small-town pastoral in the best works of Ray Bradbury and
Clifford Simak, it is an artisanal world against the scarcity of which the
various commodities once more recover their true taste and reassert a use-value
to which the jaded sensibilities of the affluent society, brainwashed by
advertising, had become insensitive: so now there is something precious about
the individual cigarette, made of real tobacco, and the glass of real pre-war
Scotch, while even the language of Somerset Maugham becomes something we have to
treasure. The vision of freshening our own stale and fallen universe, of a
utopian revitalization of the tired goods and services all around us, their
projection into some genuinely Jeffersonian commonwealth beyond the bomb, is the
ultimate recompense for all those complicated struggles and interchanges we have
been describing; and they go far towards compensating for what we would
otherwise have to see as an ideological imbalance in Dick's work in general, a
status defense on the part of the artist and an idealistic overemphasis on
language and art in the place of political action. The typically American and
"liberal" hostility to politics is outweighed, it seems to me, by just
such glimpses into a reestablished collectivity, glimpses which, at the heart of
all Dick's obligatory happy endings, mark him as an anti-Vonnegut, as the
unseasonable spokesman for a historical consciousness distinct from and superior
to that limited dystopian and apocalyptic vision so fashionable in Western SF
today.
NOTES
1This forbidding apparatus is based on the idea that concepts do
not exist in isolation but are defined in opposition to each other, in
relatively organized clusters; and on the further refinement that there is a
basic distinction between the opposite, or contrary, of a contradictory, þ.
Thus if S is the Good, then -S is Evil, while þ
is that somewhat different category of things "not good" in general.
The determination of the negative of -S is more complicated, as we show in the
text; and as is also demonstrated further on, there is the further possibility
of more complicated terms which unite these simple ones in various ways. See for
further discussion of this schema, A.J. Greimas, "The Interaction of
Semiotic Constraints," Yale French Studies, #41, 1968; and also my Prison-House
of Language (Princeton 1972), pp. 162-68.
#See "The Structural Study of Myth," in Structural Anthropology
(Anchor 1967), pp. 202-28.
ABSTRACT
Dicks voluminous work can be seen as falling into
various distinct thematic groups or cycles: there is, for instance, the early Van Vogtian
game-playing cycle, the Nazi cycle (e.g., The Man in the High Castle, The
Unteleported Man), a relatively minor Jungian cycle (of which the best effort is Galactic
Pot-Healer), and finally the "metaphysical" cycle which includes his most
striking novels to date, Ubik and The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch. In
such a view, Dr. Bloodmoney (1965) can be assigned to a small but crucial middle
group of eschatological novels, along with its less successful companion-piece, The
Simulacra. In these two works, for the first time, there emerges that bewildering and
kaleidoscopic plot structure we associate with Dicks mature productions. At the same
time, this cycle helps us to understand the origins and function of this sudden and
alarming proliferation of sub-plots, minor characters, and exuberantly episodic
digressions, for both of these works dramatize the utopian purgation of a fallen and
historically corrupted world by some final climactic overloading, some ultimate explosion
beyond which the outlines of a new and simpler social order emerge. But in the two cases,
the "coding" of the evil, as well as its exorcism, is different: in The
Simulacra, this is political and economic, and it is a big-corporation,
entertainment-industry-type power elite which invites purgation. In Dr. Bloodmoney,
the historical crisis is expressed in terms of the familiar counterculture denunciation of
an evil or perverted science (compare Kurt Vonnegut in Cats Cradle), only too
emblematically exposed by the invention of the atom bomb.
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