#77 = Volume 26, Part 1 = March 1999
Carl Silvio
Refiguring the Radical Cyborg in
Mamoru Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell
In 1985, Donna Haraway first published "A Cyborg
Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth
Century," an "ironic political myth" which theorized the
liberatory potential inherent in women’s interactions with information
technology. While well aware of the role such technology plays in the
maintenance of social control and patriarchy, Haraway refuses its demonization,
opting instead to hold two contradictory attitudes concerning cyborgs in tension
throughout her essay. Though the cyborg, "a hybrid of machine and
organism" (149), may represent the final imposition of information
technology as a means of social control, it may also be potentially recoded and
appropriated by feminism as a means of dismantling the binarisms and categorical
ways of thinking that have characterized the history of Western culture. The
cyborg, in other words, serves as a representational figure that embodies the
capacity of information technologies to erase gender and racial boundaries and
the structures of oppression which have historically accompanied them.
Simultaneously, it also paradigmatically stands for what Mary Ann Doane refers
to as the "individious network of invisible power relationships made
possible through high technology" (211). As Doane observes, despite Haraway’s
attempt to hold these two perspectives in tension, "the radical cyborg
ultimately seems to win out" (211). Haraway, by this account, finally seems
to endorse the cyborg as an imaginary figuration of a posthuman, post-gendered
subject who has slipped the bonds of dominant culture.
In the thirteen years since Haraway’s article first
appeared, this fantasy seems to have acquired a great deal of currency in the
popular media as well. A recent MCI commercial which proclaims the internet as a
"utopian" space devoid of race, gender, age, or infirmity, attests to
the growing popularity of this idea, the increasing belief that information
technology and "cyberspace" are bringing us ever closer to a world
free of social inequity. Usually lost in such corporate endorsements of
cyberspace, however, is the other half of Haraway’s argument, the sense that
the cyborg equally figures the potential for increased social domination
inherent in such new technology. Consequently, not all cultural analysts share
in this burgeoning enthusiasm for the new frontier. Anne Balsamo, for instance,
argues that, while cyberspace and other instances of cyborg culture seem
"to represent a territory free from the burdens of history, it will, in
effect, serve as another site for the technological and no less conventional
inscription of the gendered, race-marked body" (131). By her account,
despite the fact that these technological advancements hold out the promise
of new identities, they have thus far actually delivered what she terms
"the rearticulation of old identities to new technologies" (131). In
light of this, Balsamo conceives her role as a feminist to lie in unraveling
this process of rearticulation by connecting "seemingly isolated moments of
discourse into a narrative that helps us make sense of [cultural]
transformations as they emerge" (161).
I am particularly interested in Balsamo’s suggestion that
the popular discourse surrounding cyborg culture promises something other than
what it provides. It is not, in other words, simply that the increasingly
complex interfaces between human and machine work to reify traditional
dichotomies of gender, but that their various articulations within our social
imaginary present them as exactly the opposite. There is thus what might be
called an element of seduction at work, whereby information technology often
presents itself to us as potentially liberating when in fact our actual
interactions with it often reinforce conventional social structures of
domination.
Pop-cultural representations of the cyborg participate in
this seduction by serving as part of what Gabriele Schwab terms "the
fantasmatic aspects of the technological imagination"—that is, the ways
in which such representations "become a field of cathexis, an imaginary
screen onto which psychic energies from the most archaic to the most up-to-date
may be projected" (68). The figure of the cyborg thus represents an
imaginary projection into the realm of popular fiction, a trope invested with
cultural anxieties and beliefs about contemporary technology. But such fictions,
of course, function in society as more than the representation of cultural
attitudes; they also perform ideological operations by shaping and reinforcing
current belief systems as well. Fictional representations of the cyborg
therefore provide ideal sites for the examination of how the interface with
technology can be presented to us as liberating, as what Althusser would
call "an imaginary representation of the relation of individuals to their
real conditions of existence" (123), while simultaneously naturalizing and
buttressing existing social relations. It should be noted, however, that this
process of naturalization may not work in the automatic way that Althusser’s
model has often been criticized for suggesting. Following Raymond Williams, I
wish to view the fictional representation of the cyborg as an ideological site
that works "toward the setting of limits and the exertion of pressure and
away from a predicted, prefigured and controlled content" (380).
It is not, however, always the case that the image of
the cyborg appeals to a hope for social justice while our actual material
interactions with technology, our "real conditions of existence,"
further entangle us within networks of domination. Oftentimes, this drama is
played out entirely within the realm of the social imaginary itself. In these
cases, the radical cyborg is both validated and made to serve the interests of
the dominant within a single fictional text. Such texts present and seem to
endorse the radical cyborg, an image resonant with liberatory possibilities
which solicits a belief in technology’s capacity to provide social justice,
while simultaneously using this image to support existing structures of cultural
hegemony. The radical cyborg thus imaginarily gratifies various liberatory
fantasies which have, in a sense, already been coded in the terms of the
dominant because they have been naturalized within the social imaginary itself.
I contend that Mamoru Oshii’s animated cyberpunk film Ghost
in the Shell works in just such a way. In what follows, I will examine how
this film, a fascinating example of Japanese animation (or anime),
participates in the seductive appeal of the radical cyborg. I will argue that it
functions as an inverse of Jean-Louis Comolli’s "fifth type" of
ideological film, a film which "seem[s] at first sight to belong firmly
within the [dominant] ideology and to be completely under its sway, but which
turn[s] out to be so only in an ambiguous manner" (Comolli 27). For Comolli,
such films "throw up obstacles in the way of ideology, causing it to swerve
and get off course" (27). Ghost in the Shell, by contrast, appears
at first sight to subvert radically the power dynamics inherent in dominant
structures of gender and sexual difference, while covertly reinscribing them.
It could be argued that cyberpunk lends itself perfectly to
just such an ideological process. Several critics have accused its literary
manifestations of failing adequately to represent feminist issues and concerns
despite the fact that its depictions of the interaction between humans and
technology seem to offer just such a promise. Karen Cadora claims that
"Cyberpunk’s deconstruction of the human body first appeared to signal a
revolution in political art. However, closer examinations of the movement have
revealed that its politics are anything but revolutionary" (357). For
Cadora, cyberpunk is "very much a boy’s club" (357), its writers
guilty of providing few female protagonists and reiterating feminine stereotypes
(357-358). She thus calls for a "feminist cyberpunk," a development
which "envisions something that feminist theory badly needs: fragmented
subjects who can, despite their multiple positionings, negotiate and succeed in
a high-tech world" (357). At first glance, Ghost in the Shell
appears to offer something akin to this model by providing us with a fragmented
female subject who seems to correspond to what Cadora envisions. In spite of
this, however, I believe that the film re-enacts the same failure that Cadora
locates in earlier cyberpunk texts—that is, the failure to deliver on its
revolutionary promise.
The film, in other words, gives an outlet and a voice to the
liberatory potential of the cyborg, to Haraway’s "ironic political myth
faithful to feminism" (149), while simultaneously containing that potential
by re-narrating it within another older and better known myth: the dominance of
masculine mind and spirit over the feminine materiality of the body. By focusing
on the main character, Major Motoko Kusanagi, a female cyborg, and her
adversary, The Puppet Master, a life form made of pure data, I hope to provide
the critical "opening up" of the text which reveals its reactionary
agenda. Because I wish to analyze this film in terms of how it functions as an
instrument of ideological containment that seems to be subversive on its
"surface" while contextualizing that subversion within a traditional
paradigm of sexual difference, my argument will take the form of a dual reading.
I will first read the film as a progressive representation of the cyborg that
challenges dominant culture in order to demonstrate how it creates the illusion
that the dominant is really being challenged. I will then re-consider this
reading by re-examining the film in order to show how its subversive potential
has been, in effect, de-fanged and redirected to serve more conservative
interests.
I should stress, however, that my examination will focus on
how this film functions ideologically within the context of American popular
culture and that the subsequent reading will necessarily treat the translated
version in relation to this culturally specific locale. While the context of the
film’s original production may at first seem to mitigate against such a
reading, Analee Newitz observes that "Although anime does often
strike us as utterly different, or ‘other,’ it also quite noticeably
resembles—and is influenced by—American culture and generic narratives"
(3). Given this resemblance, particularly in terms of thematic content, the
consideration of the ideological implications of this film within the context of
cyberpunk fiction in America seems both appropriate and legitimate.
Significantly, Newitz goes on to claim that the "stake[s] for Americans
watching anime [are] certainly bound up with gender identity...."
(4). While Japanese anime, in general, may have a predominantly
"cult" appeal in the United States, being consumed by a largely
"alternative culture" (Newitz 3), Ghost in the Shell
appears to have been designed for mainstream consumption. I believe that its
popularity in the United States makes an analysis of the film’s ideological
operations in terms of American cultural norms entirely appropriate.1
I. The Radical Cyborg
I would like to begin my first reading by considering how
Major Kusanagi’s cybernetic construction works within the narrative both to
reverse traditional gender roles and, sometimes, to efface them completely.
Kusanagi, referred to in the film as "Major," lives in the year 2029.
Her body, a composite of organic tissue and machinery complete with enhanced
senses, strength, and reflexes,2has been manufactured by Megatech, a
corporation which specializes in the production of high-tech cyborg
"shells." Her mind, or "ghost," consists of organic brain
cells housed in the titanium shell of her skull and augmented by a supplemental
computer brain, an arrangement which allows her to interface directly with
computer systems and sometimes access, or "ghost hack," the minds of
other cyborgs. Major, whose original body—the source for her organic brain—never
figures in the plot, works as a special agent for Section Nine, a branch of what
appears to be the Japanese government (it is never clearly specified) that deals
in espionage and counter-terrorism; she is considered to be one of that agency’s
best operatives. Her incredible competence at her job and her positioning as the
narrative’s central protagonist effectively invert the gender roles
conventionally allocated to fictional characters and afford Kusanagi a degree of
narrative agency, an agency which, significantly, is bound up with her
cybernetic construction.
Kusanagi’s centrality within this narrative can be seen
most clearly in the contrast between her and Togusa, one of her male partners.
Togusa, a recent addition to Section Nine from the regular police force, is
almost entirely human, having a completely organic body and a brain which has
merely been supplemented with "a few cybernetic implants" that allow
him to access the data-net. Major’s enhanced cyborg body, however, enables her
to perform athletic and martial feats that consistently outstrip anything of
which Togusa is capable. This increased ability in combat effectively positions
her as his superior, though there is never any direct indication that she in any
way officially outranks him. Thus, even the most cursory first reading of the
film suggests that cyborg technology has endowed a female character with a
marked degree of power and positioned Togusa in the more "feminized"
role of inferiority.3 Major makes the decisions in their partnership
while Togusa finds himself relegated to the role of "sidekick." While
Balsamo claims that "cyberspace heroes are usually men, whose racial
identity, although rarely described, is contextually white" (131), one
could argue that Ghost in the Shell challenges this paradigm by deploying
an Asian cyborg woman as the hero of its plot.4
While this film may present the cyborg as a vehicle
for the inversion of gender roles, its most significant and interesting
challenge to patriarchal modes of authority can be located in its valorization
of the posthuman, post-gendered subject. This text seems literally to enact
Haraway’s advocacy of "pleasure in the confusion of boundaries," her
conception of the cyborg as part of a "utopian tradition of imagining a
world without gender" (150). In Haraway’s terms,
There is nothing about being "female" that
naturally binds women. There is not even such as a state as "being"
female, itself a highly complex category constructed in contested sexual
scientific discourses and other social practices. Gender, race, or class
consciousness is an achievement forced on us by the terrible historical
experience of the contradictory social realities of patriarchy, colonialism,
and capitalism. (155)
Haraway thus values the cyborg for its capacity to dismantle
the traditional humanist subject, a figure whose sense of identity is derived
from attributes—such as sex or gender—that supposedly adhere in the
ontology of his or her being, but which have actually been socially constructed
and ideologically naturalized. While the cyborg can easily (and usually does)
represent cultural anxieties and fears about the loss of coherent subjectivity,
Haraway prizes it precisely for its potential to contest this essentialism and
expose its status as an ideological construct.
Ghost in the Shell dramatizes both of these
possibilities through its two main characters, Kusanagi and The Puppet Master,
who can be read as allegories of each position respectively. While the film
eventually comes (or so it seems) to privilege Major’s cyborgian ontology as a
vehicle of liberation, in the first half of the narrative she must initially
confront the terrifying loss of subjectivity that her identity seems to imply.
The Puppet Master, or Project 2051, can be read as a less equivocal
representation of how technology can enable one to transcend the prescriptive
limits of our contemporary social environment.
Early in the film, Kusanagi undergoes a profound humanist
crisis concerning her cybernetic construction and what it suggests about her
identity. Despite her success as an operative, Major is acutely aware that her
entire sense of self and consciousness are inseparable from the organization to
which she belongs; it has supplied all the hardware and software that make her
who she is and can repossess them should she ever decide to quit. In a pivotal
scene, Kusanagi and Botau, a fellow cyborg employed by Section Nine, discuss the
implications of this fact. When Major complains that their cybernetic shells and
auxiliary computer brains are all technically owned by others, Botau responds
that "It doesn’t mean that we’ve sold our souls to Section Nine."
In response, she claims that
We do have the right to resign if we choose. Provided we
give back our cyborg shells and the memories they hold. Just as there are many
parts needed to make a human a human, there’s a remarkable number of things
needed to make an individual what they are. A face to distinguish yourself
from others. A voice you aren’t aware of yourself. The hands you see when
you awaken. The memories of childhood, the feelings of the future. That’s
not all. There’s the expanse of the data-net my cyber brain can access. All
of that goes into making me what I am, giving rise to a consciousness that I
call me. And simultaneously confining me within set limits.
These remarks harken back to what Haraway terms the
"informatics of domination," the "rearrangements of world-wide
social relations tied to science and technology" (161). According to the
logic of this new arrangement, the constitutive components of our lives,
including our identities, can no longer be thought of as natural entities, can
no longer be defined by an ontology of essence. The world has, instead, become
coded; its elements are defined, not by an inner/outer dichotomy, but by their
relational positions within larger systems of information. Kusanagi’s sense of
self thus does not derive from a supposedly interior source, from a "real
self" that animates a body that physically establishes its identity, but
rather from her relation to the organization to which she belongs. Because
Section Nine actually owns the material underpinnings of her subjectivity, her
sense of personhood cannot be thought of apart from its bureaucratic
organizational structure. Major’s body thus does not exist as an ontologically
stable presence that guarantees her identity, but as an ensemble of parts that
circulate within a larger system. In short, the body, and its constitutive
parts, behaves much like a signifier within a postmodern information system, its
meaning determined not by a self-adhering presence but by its position within
the overall pattern. In an interesting elaboration of Haraway, N. Katherine
Hayles notes that "When bodies are [thus] constituted as information, they
can not only be sold but fundamentally reconstituted in response to
market pressure" (86; my italics). This is one of the most feared aspects
of cyborg technology, its ability to transform the material body into something
akin to coded information, thereby making it more amenable and vulnerable to
social control.
Because Kusanagi’s "inner self" is largely
determined by her corporeality—her tactile memories, sensations, and the
organic tissue in her skull—that self is subordinate to the systems within
which her body circulates. It should be noted, however, that this subordination
of Kusanagi’s material self already lays the groundwork for the supposed
liberation of the mind from the body in the subsequent narrative that follows
the conversation between Kusanagi and Botau. In other words, the malleability
and submission of the body in relation to the larger system not only makes it
more amenable to social control but, by virtue of the very devaluation which
necessarily accompanies this process, suggests that it is alterable, or even
dispensable, as well. While the body’s status as nothing but a "shell" may work
to control the occupant of that shell, it also suggests the possibility that the
shell could be re-coded, exchanged for another, or discarded entirely. This
paradoxical doubling of meanings associated with the cyborg body, the fact that
its coded nature can serve the interests of liberation or domination, closely
parallels the contradictory nature of cyborg
politics as described by Haraway. Though Kusanagi’s initial remarks to Botau
on this subject emphasize the more terrifying aspects of this sort of
embodiment, the narrative will soon privilege the more liberatory possibilities
associated with technology’s intersection with the body.
Ghost in the Shell provides us with just such an
alternative vision of information technology through its chief antagonist, The
Puppet Master. For several years, Section Nine has been tracking this entity, a
cyber-terrorist who commits acts of international theft and sabotage while
masking his identity by ghost-hacking into other cyborgs and using their shells
as platforms from which to access the various information systems that he has
targeted. Section Nine does not realize that the Puppet Master has no
"human" identity at all, but is in fact a computer program secretly
created by Section Six, the department of Foreign Affairs. Section Six uses this
program, designated as "Project 2051," to commit acts of espionage
that will "grease the wheels" of foreign diplomacy. As Project 2051
circulates within the data matrices of the net, however, it somehow gains
sentience, becomes convinced that it is a new life form, and escapes the control
of its creators.
As a disembodied, electronic entity, Project 2051 represents
a truly technologized, posthuman subject, an example of a non-human
cyber-consciousness whose computerized existence enables rather than limits.
This character reminds us that the informatics of domination do not exclusively
serve as a final or more advanced form of social control but as a new set of
social relations that can be equally used to contest the dominant. As Haraway
points out, "we are not dealing with a technological determinism, but with
a historical system depending upon structured relations among people"
(165). Cyber-technology’s capacity to "dematerialize" the body can
thus be articulated with a strategy for escaping contemporary institutions of
power. This transcendence of the limits of corporeality constitutes the ideal
that cyberpunk fiction itself seemed to promise to its early audience.5
As Hayles notes, "The contrast between the body’s limitations and
cyberspace’s power highlights the advantages of [a body as] pattern over
presence. As long as pattern endures, one has attained a kind of
immortality" (81). If we read this comment against the tenets of Haraway’s
earlier essay, it would seem that this transcendence of the body allows the
transcendence of sexual specificity, a concept that Haraway suggests is a social
construct of patriarchy.
In keeping with this hypothesis, The Puppet Master seems to lack
any clear specification of gender or sex. More significantly, this character
does not evidence the total absence of sexual specificity, but seems to
exhibit characteristics of both sexes while technically, as a machine, belonging
to neither. When Project 2051 first appears on the screen, it inhabits the body
of a female cyborg, having been lured into this shell by operatives within
Section Six who desire to recapture it. The film emphasizes the sexual
specificity of this shell by representing it as a naked body—the cyborg
shell has just come off the Megatech assembly line when it is hacked and
animated by the Puppet Master and thus would not have been clothed. Soon after
its animation, the shell escapes the Megatech production plant and is
accidentally run down on the highway by a truck, only to be subsequently
recovered by Section Nine technicians. When Chief Nakamura, an administrator
from Foreign Affairs, and Dr. Willis, an American scientist who has collaborated
on the project, arrive to recover the body, they consistently refer to it as
"he," a reference which confuses the Section Nine personnel. Nakamura
informs them that "Its original sex remains undetermined and the use of the
term ‘he’ is merely a nickname the good doctor has given it." Nakamura’s
voice, however, is juxtaposed with a full-screen frontal shot of the naked
cyborg torso, breasts prominently centered. The conflation of the masculine
pronoun with the naked female body disorients not only the Section Nine
technicians but the viewer as well, as we are presented with a character of
"undetermined" sex that figures as linguistically male but visually
female. While this scene may not represent the actual transcendence of a
sexed or gendered identity, it does represent the capacity of cyber-technology
to confuse and disrupt its conventional deployment (including the fact that
cyborg shells are mass-produced as either male or female semblances).
The film’s climactic ending finalizes this disruption when
Major permanently merges her consciousness with The Puppet Master’s to form
an entirely new identity. In order for Project 2051 to "truly" become
a "living," post-gendered organism, it must merge with an organic
lifeform. The Puppet Master, as a disembodied, electronic consciousness, thus
seeks out special agent Major as the element that he apparently needs to achieve
his plan. The film ends with Major and the Puppet Master uniting their
consciousnesses to form an entirely new identity, a completely new individual,
that allows them finally to escape the control of the organizations that created
them. But how exactly is this escape achieved? How, in The Puppet Master’s
words, will the two characters, as one, "slip our bonds and shift to the
higher structure" of existence?
Though the film is not terribly clear about how this process
is fulfilled, I suggest that the answer to this question can be found in the
fact that the Major’s body is literally blown to bits by Section Six
operatives seeking to recover The Puppet Master immediately after the
unification takes place. This loss of Major’s body requires Botau to purchase
a new shell on the black market and transplant her surviving "brain
case"—which presumably now holds the entity produced by her union with
The Puppet Master—into it. This new body, because of its illicit and
unauthorized origins, seemingly lies outside the systemic network of Section
Nine’s control. Cyber-technology, while not allowing the ultimate
transcendence of the body’s limitations, thus enables the individual to
"recode" or alter the material conditions of his or her corporeality.
If a cyborg body can more readily function as a prison than a
"natural" one due to the fact that its composite parts are actually
owned by its dominators, that body can also, by virtue of its constructed
status, be redesigned or, in this case, exchanged for one that provides a
greater degree of personal agency. I will return, in more detail, to this scene
in the second half of my analysis, paying particular attention to the fact that
Kusanagi’s new body is that of a young girl. For now, I wish to consider it as
an example of how the radical cyborg can representationally serve as a vehicle
for the dismantling of conventionally figured subjects.
In addition to matters of narrative content, Ghost in the
Shell also subverts the conventional construction of sexual identity in ways
that are specific to its animated form as well. While Kusanagi, as a character,
may long for a stable and embodied identity throughout most of the film, the
visual construction of her body as a narrative signifier can be read as a
textual resistance to the gendered body as a key component of subjectivity. How
this is so becomes apparent if we consider her, as an animated action hero, in
relation to the various male cyborgs depicted in the film. The combination of
cyber-technology and the organic has effectively made Kusanagi
"superhuman," a state which allows us to categorize her as one of the
many animated, superpowered crime fighters who have historically populated the
genres of film, television, and comic books. As such an animated superhero,
Kusanagi seems closely related to those characters who inhabit what Pamela Boker
terms the "thriving art medium" of action comics, "a medium that
offers an alternative archetype to American women" (108). According to
Boker,
In the mainstream comic books of the last decade, the
question of female inferiority is rarely verbalized within the text, and would
be considered a cliché issue. The women superheroes are super-female in their
appearance, and the men are super-male, but the concepts of femininity and
masculinity, as cultural categories embodying the attributes of passivity and
aggressiveness, are all but eliminated. (108)
If we read Kusanagi in this way, we find just such an
elimination of conventional gender attributes in her relationship with Botau.
Major and Botau are textually represented as hyperbolic extremes of femininity
and masculinity respectively, a female body that corresponds to a contemporary,
Western ideal of feminine beauty in its physical proportions alongside a
gigantically muscled masculine frame. Ghost in the Shell, however,
visually deploys these bodies as narrative signifiers that have been stripped of
the qualities they conventionally signify: passivity and aggressiveness. More
precisely, because both of these bodies signify aggressiveness and
martial prowess within the film, they exemplify something akin to free variation—that
is, the material differences between these bodily signifiers do not similarly
correspond to differing signifieds. Just as Boker suggests, both bodies signify
traits conventionally attributed to masculinity in a process that effectively
"flattens out" and eliminates the importance of sexual difference
within the narrative. In a fictional world where strength, speed, and a killer
instinct count above all else, it matters little whether one "has" a
male or female body when either can embody these traits. There are, of course,
problems with such an argument which I will discuss later in my alternative
reading of the film. For now, however, I hope to demonstrate how the visual
construction of Kusangi as a narrative signifier operates in ways that
potentially lend themselves to arguments such as Boker’s.
All of these elements—the inversion of gender roles, the
valorization of the post-gendered subject, and the reduction of the significance
of the sexual specificity of the material body—contribute to Ghost in the
Shell’s appeal as a resistant film. Several questions, however, still
remain to be answered. To what extent have these fictional manifestations of the
radical cyborg been redirected and inscribed within more conventional and
traditional cultural narratives? To what extent does this film replicate
familiar deployments of sexual difference even as it seems to unravel them? Is
the contestatory signification of Kusanagi’s body within the narrative
recontained within a more conventional schema of specularization and
objectification of the female body? The answer to these questions will emerge
through a closer reading of certain key segments of the film.
II. Traditional Configurations of Sexual Difference
To begin my second reading of this film, I wish to reconsider
the visual construction of Kusanagi’s body within the text. I have previously
claimed that Ghost in the Shell can be read as deploying hyperbolized
examples of masculine and feminine bodies to signify virtually identical
narrative roles, thus "canceling out" the significance of each body’s
sexual specificity. While the film may invite such a reading, it becomes
questionable when we consider how these bodies demonstrate their sexual
specificity in the first place, how they are visually presented as hyperbolized
examples of their respective sexes.
Though Major and Botau are both presented as classic ideals of
sexual corporeality, Kusanagi’s body spends much more time in a state of
nakedness. This is because her cyborg shell comes equipped with thermo-optic
camouflage, a technological innovation built right into its skin that bends
light rays around the user, rendering her invisible. Thus, whenever she enters
combat, Major usually removes her clothing so that her opponent will not be able
to see her. There is, of course, always the not-so-brief moment between the
undressing and the activation of the thermo-optics in which the audience views
her completely naked form. While other characters also have access to such
camouflage, they use it in the form of a special clothing which, when donned,
creates the desired invisibility. None of the male characters ever disrobe or
appear naked.
Additionally, Kusanagi is often cinematically positioned in
relation to male characters through the employment of various shot-reverse-shot
structures that conform perfectly to Hollywood cinema’s familiar inscription
of the female body as it has been described by feminist film scholarship.6
One such instance occurs in the aforementioned scene where Kusanagi and Botau
discuss how their cyborg bodies determine their senses of selfhood. The setting
for this scene is the deck of a small pleasure boat, Kusanagi having just
finished some recreational scuba diving. As the two characters begin to speak to
each other, the camera tracks7 Kusanagi to the doorway of the cabin
where she begins to remove her wetsuit. We are then offered a shot of Botau,
with mouth agape, looking at her, followed by a quick reverse shot back to
Kusanagi, the object of his gaze. In the reverse shot, the female cyborg is
positioned with her back to the camera—now the surrogate for both Botau and
the spectator’s gaze—her wetsuit unzipped to below waist level, revealing
the top portion of her buttocks. Because her face is averted from the source of
these multiple looks (the camera, Botau, and the spectator), Kusanagi does not
return them and thus serves instead as their passive, eroticized object.
This is only one example of many instances in which the
subversive potential of Kusanagi’s cyborg body is undermined by its specific
inscription within the film’s cinematic form. The opening credits of the film,
for instance, which depict the Major’s original construction at Megatech, are
similarly problematic. This sequence runs for about five minutes and consists
entirely of shots of Kusanagi’s naked body intercut with images of machinery
and computer screens. At other times, the camera almost seems to take pleasure
in surprising the audience by revealing the sexual specificity of Kusanagi’s
body immediately after it has visually presented it in a way that obfuscates its
gendering. The final sequence of the opening credits presents viewers with a
close-up of the Major’s face as she awakens from sleep. Due to the combination
of light and shadows which have been drawn into the scene, one is hard-pressed
to determine if we are looking at a male or female visage, an indeterminacy
which is furthered by the fact that the character’s hair falls across her
face. The camera then cuts to a much longer shot of Kusanagi, sitting up and
stepping out of bed, clad in a skimpy tank top and panties, her body clearly
marked as female.8
It could be argued that this blatant objectification is
simply part of Ghost in the Shell’s sexual hyperbole, its deployment of
traditional representations of sexed bodies. Could we not say that while Major’s
ongoing striptease before the camera facilitates her construction as a classic
and traditional signifier of femininity, the subsequent narrativization of this
signifier—its positioning within the plot—undercuts its alignment with the
conventional? Does not the film, in other words, while undoubtedly relying upon
many classic visual tropes in order to represent differently sexed bodies,
ultimately eliminate or disrupt the significance of these tropes by assigning
all bodies the same narrative attributes? I wish to approach this problem by way
of a slight detour through Balsamo’s observations concerning the public
discourse surrounding female athletics and body building.
Balsamo notes that the dominant conception of femininity has
historically excluded women from sport and exercise, the rationale being that
such exclusion served "to protect them for the important job of species
reproduction" (43). In the latter half of the twentieth century, however,
women’s athletics have become increasingly popular and a new conception of the
female body began to circulate within our culture’s public discourses—the
athletic, muscular woman. Such an image of the female body would seem to possess
a tremendous potential to destabilize normative conceptions of sexual identity
because "To be both female and strong implicitly violates traditional codes
of feminine identity" (43). Public discourse, however, usually reinscribes
such a body within traditional paradigms of femininity through the linkage of
its athletic capabilities to more conventional methods of coding women as visual
spectacle. In the case of Florence Griffith-Joyner, a 1988 Olympic track and
field star, Balsamo notes how the media performed a "process of
sexualization" upon her athleticized body, most stories finding "a way
to mention her body, not only in reference to its athletic capacity, but more
obviously as it served as a mannequin for her flamboyant track outfits"
(45). In much the same way that I am arguing for the reinscription and
ideological containment of the radical cyborg, the media coverage of
Griffith-Joyner’s exploits served to contain the subversive potential of her
body by coding it according to more familiar feminine attributes, fashion and
spectacle.
I would argue that Ghost in the Shell’s obsessive
objectification of Kusanagi’s body works in a similar way. While I have
suggested that the attribution of "masculine" characteristics to this
character works to minimize the significance of its feminine coding, we can also
argue exactly the opposite. The visual objectification of Kusanagi’s nudity
more likely serves to negate the significance of her occupation of a masculine
narrative position. This might not be the case if the film objectified the male
cyborgs with equal intensity, if they signified their maleness in a way similar
to the signification of Kusanagi’s female body. This is the case, I believe,
in the action comics referred to by Boker. While "The women superheroes [in
those texts] are super-female in their appearance, and the men are
super-male," the rendering of their appearances is much more equitable; the
artists objectify both sets of superheroes equally (109). Boker’s argument
does not quite work for Ghost in the Shell, however, because Kusanagi’s
femaleness emerges in a way that differs so dramatically from the depiction of
masculinity throughout the film. In other words, while Botau’s features may
correspond to a dominant ideal of masculinity (muscularity, broad shoulders,
square jaw, etc.), these features emerge for the viewer as a necessary part of
the narrative; there is no gratuitous lingering of the camera’s gaze on his
body in shots that seem designed exclusively for erotic enjoyment. For Kusanagi,
the film deploys rather conventional cinematic devices to reproduce normative
codes of feminine beauty as a way of recontaining the destabilizing threat posed
by the radical cyborg to dominant conceptions of sexual difference. Kusanagi is
thus reinscribed within one of our most familiar paradigms of femininity: woman
as sexualized object for the enjoyment of the male gaze.
This is, of course, not the only way in which the film
conducts its operation of recontainment. Ghost in the Shell, in what is
perhaps the film’s most powerful ideological strategy, also invokes and
mobilizes the familiar paradigm of "woman as maternal body" as its
chief means of disarming the radical cyborg. While the film’s ending, the
final psychic union of Kusanagi and the Puppet Master, seems to valorize
cybertechnology for enabling the progressive recoding and manipulation of the
material constraints of the body by a newly liberated mind, it curiously seems
to rely upon a traditional conception of the body in order to make this point.
While Haraway privileges the radical cyborg for its capacity to recode the
sexual subject and reconfigure gender roles, the final merger of Kusanagi and
Project 2051 unfolds within a very conventional narrative of corporeality. As I
noted earlier, The Puppet Master’s need to merge with an organic life
form—or at least an entity like Kusanagi who possesses organic tissue—coincides
with their mutual re-embodiment in a new cyborg shell which is not embedded in
Section Nine’s system of control. Surprisingly, however, this process of
re-embodiment ultimately ends up gendering the material body in a way that
perpetuates the body’s historical construction within the narrative of
patriarchy.
How this gendering takes place emerges into sharper focus with
the consideration of Elizabeth Grosz’s claim that
Patriarchal oppression ... justifies itself, at least in
part, by connecting women much more closely than men to the body and, through
this identification, restricting women’s social and economic roles to
(pseudo) biological terms. Relying on essentialism, naturalism and biologism,
misogynist thought confines women to the biological requirements of
reproduction.... (14)
In keeping with this history, masculinity has been
traditionally more closely aligned with the mind, reason, and consciousness.
Haraway envisions the radical cyborg as a means of overcoming precisely this
sort of patriarchal coding of the female body as a site of reproduction, a
hypothesis that our previous reading of the film seems to bear out. After all,
as my first reading has demonstrated, Ghost in the Shell seems to present
Kusanagi as just such a "re-coded" female cyborg. If we temporarily
bracket our re-reading of Kusanagi’s highly objectified visual inscription and
remind ourselves that, diegetically, her cyborg construction seems to eradicate
or invert her alignment with conventional gender roles, then there really should
be no reason to assume that her material embodiment, so desired by The Puppet
Master, stands as a specifically feminine corporeality. Furthermore,
given Project 2051’s problematically gendered identity, we should also have
no reason to associate its disembodied consciousness with some masculinist
fantasy of pure reason. We would have no reason to make these
associations were it not for the fact that the film rhetorically presents and
explains the union of these two characters in language that replicates the
rhetoric of conventional, heterosexual reproduction.
Once The Puppet Master approaches Kusanagi and explains what
he needs her for, the language of his proposal aligns Major with a very
traditional feminine role, one that is synonymous with "the biological
requirements of reproduction" decried by Grosz. This alignment becomes most
clear when Project 2051 enters Kusanagi’s shell and psychically informs her
that "you will bear my offspring onto the net itself." Consider for a
moment just how strange this claim is. The new, posthuman subject produced by
their union results from an amalgamation of both Kusanagi and the Puppet
Master, a relationship in which the "parents" actually cease to exist,
the offspring being a literal combination of their respective subjectivities.
Such a form of reproduction potentially problematizes normative heterosexual
reproduction because the parents, in this case, do not really produce a
completely "new" person so much as they become it. Simply put,
Kusanagi does not "give birth" in the traditional sense of the term.
The parents, thus, are and are not the child, a state which, while
not completely dissimilar to the account given us by human genetics, certainly
seems to differ from it in significant ways.
The most important of these differences lies in the fact that
Kusanagi’s body does not serve as a passive vehicle that produces a new body.
Instead, it resists its conventional deployment within patriarchy as
"passive and reproductive" (Grosz 9) by actually becoming the child, a
role which it shares with the "father." There is thus really no need
for The Puppet Master to describe Major as the "bearer" of his
offspring because she really is no such thing. Yet this is precisely how he
describes her. The evocation of this conventional trope of reproduction, the
female body as the bearer of life, profoundly qualifies the subversive potential
of the film’s ending by transforming Kusanagi’s radically re-coded and
resistant cyborg body into a maternal body, a vehicle for the production of
offspring. Because this final scene is entirely packaged within the familiar
rhetoric of this trope, it is difficult for the audience not to think of
Kusanagi as anything other than a "mother," a maternal figure whose
role is ultimately synonymous with her corporeality. The fact that the new (Kusanagi/Puppet
Master) entity’s replacement shell is that of a child further strengthens the
efficacy of the reproduction trope as a vehicle of containment. Finally, when we
consider that Project 2051 effectively ghost-hacks into Major’s shell and
takes possession of it, controlling all of her physical actions during this
scene, we find that her body is not only maternal but passive as well.
By assuming a dominant, controlling role in this
relationship, by occupying the position of one who enters the female body and
enables it to bear its cybernetic fruit, The Puppet Master is effectively
inscribed within this scene as male. Though he has no sexual identity according
to the logic of the plot, his positioning within this reproductive trope is thus
unequivocally male in relation to the maternal body. I contend, therefore, that
the sudden activation of this trope within the film’s climactic scene undoes
the destabilization of binary sexual difference that Ghost in the Shell
seems to have presented to us. The evocation of this trope in the film’s
ending, the point in the narrative most strongly associated with explanation and
resolution, lends even more force to the recontainment of the radical cyborg
within the paradigm of maternity.
We can thus read the film as a cultural site that works to
produce a certain ideological belief, a belief in the persistence of traditional
gender roles and sexual identity despite the profound technological changes
impacting our culture. But, as Haraway contends, our contemporary and future
interactions with technology have the capacity to impose both a "final ...
grid of control on the planet" and provide the means to restructure our
"lived social and bodily realities" for more positive ends (154). In
many ways, Ghost in the Shell replicates both of these possibilities in
its narrative structure and visual depiction of a female cyborg, a process that
is perfectly in keeping with its status as a part of our social imaginary. I
would argue, however, that the film does more than simply mirror certain
contradictory cultural attitudes towards technology, that it works instead to resolve
these contradictions by privileging a more conservative version of sexual
identity than that offered to us by Haraway’s radical cyborg.
I doubt that this resolution stands as a complete totality,
however. The mere fact that one can read elements of radicality into this text
at all reveals that the social imaginary is a site of contestation as well as of
ideological production. I think, however, that Ghost in the Shell
ultimately encourages us to resolve the film’s contradictions by seeing
Kusanagi as a maternal figure. It places more "pressure," in Williams’s
terms, on such a reading and in so doing naturalizes the alignment of women with
motherhood and/or an eroticized spectacle offered for visual consumption. So
while various public discourses may endorse information technology as the
gateway to a new utopian frontier, it is perhaps wise to remind ourselves of
Balsamo’s cautionary advice that such discourses often "reproduce, in
hi-tech guise, traditional narratives" about gender and sexual difference
(132).
NOTES
1. On the popularity of anime in
America, see Kenny, Marin, and Pollack; on Ghost in the Shell
specifically, see Chute and Newman. For coverage of Oshii’s career, see
Patten. The magazine Animerica—whose title alone suggests a fusion of
Japanese aesthetic and American ideological interests—had a cover feature on Ghost
and an interview with Oshii in their February 1996 issue.
2. Kusanagi figures as another incarnation of
cyberpunk’s popular "razorgirl" character, the female cyborg whose
technological enhancements make her a lethal soldier and whose most famous
version is probably Molly Millions from William Gibson’s Neuromancer.
There is, interestingly, some disagreement about how efficacious such characters
are in the service of feminist agendas. Nicola Nixon, for instance, claims
(following similar arguments by Samuel R. Delany) that characters like Molly
represent an unacknoweldged debt on the part of their creators to earlier
feminst sf, particularly Joanna Russ’s character Jael from her novel The
Female Man (222). For Nixon, cyberpunk versions of the razorgirl have
generally been "depoliticized and sapped of any revolutionary energy"
(222). In contrast, Joan Gordon argues that characters like Molly, who serve no
explicit feminist agenda, still stand as positive representations of women:
"for a woman to enter the human army as an average soldier with no
distinction in rank, privilege or job position is, on the covert level, a
feminist act" (198).
3. For a complementary argument about how the
technological colonization of the male body in cyberpunk literature can be seen
as a feminizing process analogous to castration, see Ross (153).
4. Coleman offers an extended reading of Ghost
specifically in terms of issues of race and ethnicity, deploying the concept of
"invisibility" to describe how the film seems to efface conventional
markers of identity, a process about which she is generally more sanguine than I
am.
5. Whether or not it delivered on this promise
is, of course, another matter. Peter Fitting notes that "Despite the eager
reception of [William] Gibson by some tech enthusiasts and New Age visionaries,
his work is certainly not an unquestioning endorsement of technology. Rather,
computers and cyborgs have lost their previous charges,
6. There is a considerable body of material on this subject, going back to Mulvey's classic article. See also Silverman and Studlar
7. For an analysis of the similarities and
differences between live action cinema and animation, see Small and Levinson.
Noake provides a comprehensive overview of the cinematographic conventions of
animated films. For a discussion of anime specifically in terms of its
representational conventions, consult Brophy.
8. In this respect, Ghost in the Shell
seems to differ from the general trend in technologically-oriented Japanese anime.
Newitz comments that the women heroes of this genre "use their power
openly, but tend to hide their gender in one way or another.... What these anime
demonstrate is the way male and female bodies are largely indistinguishable once
wedded to mecha technologies" (8).
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