Notes, Reports, and Correspondence
Hypocrite lecteur!—mon semblable,—mon frère!As
for that book you just mentioned, I don’t give a damn that it was published in
New York rather than Indianapolis or New Haven, or that the publisher is
Harcourt rather than Bobbs-Merrill or the Yale University Press, or that it is
Number 76 in the Brace Series of Older Poets. What I do want, in addition to
author, title, and date of first publication, is information that will enable me
to find the context of any passage you quote or interpret.
You are writing an article on John Brunner’s The Jagged
Orbit and find it convenient to quote a sentence pregnant with meaning,
"Miserably she looked up at him through the window in the hood of her yash."
Having quoted it, you turn to the title page and find city and publisher—but
not the date. What to do? Since you know you have the first edition (the
first US edition anyway), having bought it the day it first appeared in the
bookstores, you are tempted simply to give the date of copyright, but think
better of it and so construct a more elaborate form: "(New York: Ace Books,
n.d. [©1969]), p. 251." And I, reading your article, locate my copy of the
book and check the title and verso, where I find, sure enough, the information
you have given. So I turn to page 251 and look in vain for the quoted sentence.
Irritated I look again at your specification of the book and again at the title
and verso of my copy—and they are still the same. Then it dawns on me that
although my copy is a hardback, Ace publishes only in paperback, and that
therefore my copy is most probably a book-club edition with pagination different
from the original. And so I look a few pages forward and a few pages back, and
then a few more forward and back, and then, determined not to give up,
sit down and read the book through until I come to page 216—and there it is!
How much time, how many pages of reading, you would have saved me if only you
had given the chapter number! And how much easier it would have been for you to
write simply "U.S., 1969, ch. 74." (It would also be easier if you
would omit all those useless periods and commas and write simply"US 1969 ch
74," but I mustn’t expect too much all at once.)
Very well, you have learned your lesson—or at least yielded
to my editorial eccentricities. So you begin to write an article on Frank
Herbert’s Dune, a long book not divided into numbered chapters, or even
named chapters. How then can you meet the SFS requirement that "when the
literary work in question has been published in several formats and hence in
several paginations, references must be made not to the pages of the edition you
happen to have but to chapters or such other divisions as the author has
provided"? For Dune, alas!, already has had at least four US
editions with differing pagination: xxvi+412, xxx+507, 544p, vi+537. Well, why
not give the pagination of your copy? That would meet the purpose of the
requirement in that it would alert me to a possible difference in pagination,
and, when I had determined what the difference was, allow me to calculate about
how many pages forward or back I would have to look to find the passage you have
cited. So if you quote "The Baron noted the trace of semuta dullness in
Nefud’s eyes" from the first edition of Dune, write "(US 1965
xxvi+412), p 185," which will enable me to find it on page 226 of the book-club
edition, page 239 of the Ace edition, or page 230 of the Berkley edition.
Indeed, I can imagine no more elegant or serviceable support for a page-reference
than "US 1965 xxvi+412."
But suppose I don’t have a copy of the book and therefore
need to locate one. Won’t I then need the information demanded by MLA style?
City of publication? No, for books are nowhere catalogued by city, only by
country. The publisher? Only in special circumstances, such as the book’s
being too new to be listed in a national catalogue. All I need is author, title,
and country of publication, together with (when pertinent) information on
editors, revised editions, etc.
Since our purpose is to give the reader the kind of
information he needs, the following rules will apply in SFS beginning with #10.
First, that in reviews of new books, or books believed to be still in print, the
name of the publisher will be given, with complete mailing address for the fan
press or more or less obscure publishers, together with the pagination and
price. Second, that in footnotes and bibliography items, publishers will not be
named
and cities of publication will be replaced with countries of
publication: US, UK, WG, USSR, France, Holland, etc. Third, that the date of
first book publication will always be given. Fourth (though I don’t
expect to be able to enforce this on every occasion), that if page references
are necessary or convenient, they will be accompanied by the pagination of the
edition being used. Fifth, that if the edition being used is not the first or
some edition that can be treated as af it were the first (a reprinting from the
same plates, or a photographic reprint), its date will be given as well as the
date of first publication, e.g. "1950; US 1975" (but this would not
ordinarily be necessary for a novel referred to by chapter). Sixth, if the
edition being used is an edited or revised edition, that fact will be indicated
in some such way as "1950; 3d edn rev 1975" or "1950; ed. John
Smith, US 1975." Finally, that these rules apply when circumstances permit:
I am quite aware that problems will arise (including problems with photographic
reprints) and so ask simply that the scholar give some thought to what the
reader needs rather than slavishly follow the MLA Style Sheet. —RDM.
On Wolk, Eisenstein, and Christianson in SFS #8.
I wish to register my dissent from positions taken in three contributions to SFS
#8, and it may even be my duty as editor of the Le Guin issue (SFS #7) to
respond to Professor Wolk and Mr Eisenstein. My friend Tony Wolk seems to me to
have—after his praises for the issue, which I certainly won’t object to—bogged
down in a bad though widespread logical fallacy, namely that there exists
criticism (or indeed any coherent writing or talking, including fiction) without
premises and presuppositions. (One of the most repetitious defenders of this
fallacy is Jack Williamson, who equates criticism with haphazard impressionist
ramblings, and any explicit critical positions with "sociological
criticism"—see his latest interview in Luna Monthly #62.) From
that premise or presupposition of his own, Mr Wolk proceeds to lament the
philosophical and political premises of some contributions in the Le Guin issue,
primarily my own. However, even if zero-premise criticism were desirable in an
angelically perfect (and I would imagine also an angelically passionless and
dull) contemplation of our sublunary affairs, it is—alas—not possible: at
least not to us sinful people immersed in the class, ethnic, gender, etc.,
alienations of our globe and our times. For example, Tony Wolk’s own premise
is that a critic can not only make a tabula rasa of all his past
experiences and suspend all his beliefs when encountering a new text, but also
that a text exists in a vacuum. Now on the very basic semantic level of
word-meanings this is not so. E.g. the expression "the dispossessed"
(as several contributors, including myself, tried briefly to show) could be the
subject of a long essay in historical changes of meaning: possession meant
something specific in Medieval times (both demonic possession and filthy lucre
being roughly equivalent), something else in the early capitalist accumulation
of More’s and Shakespeare’s time, something else again after Dostoevsky,
Freud and Hitler, etc. These are not outside criteria: THEY ARE INTRINSIC TO THE
TEXT ITSELF. No critic can even UNDERSTAND WHAT HE IS READING if he does not
have an ear for such historical semantics, which are simply a linguistic
sediment of historical relationships between a great number (between classes) of
people. Thus, if you simply take the Oxford English Dictionary and go to
work on any dozen lines of a text, you will (as Empson has amply demonstrated in
Seven Types of Ambiguity) easily be able to come up with several dozen
pages explaining the possible permutations of meaning that arise from the
historical possibilities inherent in the, say, one hundred words in those dozen
lines (not to mention the pauses and intonations marked by interpunction, which
allow totally different keys for the readings of ostensibly the same meanings—ironic
vs. serious, etc.). For a novel of 60,000 words—but even for a sonnet!—this
either reduces the critic to gibbering incoherence (not invisible in a few
critics I could name), or forces him/her to STRICTLY SELECT among all the
theoretically possible combinations of meanings educible from the OED. The same
process is then repeated several times on different levels of narrative
organization—sentence, paragraph, part of chapter, chapter, etc. Now there is
NO selection without criteria for selection—those can merely be explicitly
clear or implicitly semi-clear to the critic, and of course more or less valid
or pertinent. The criteria depend on the critic’s previous cognitive
experiences, crystallized in his approach and attitude. Thus, there is no critic
without an approach (or approaches) and an attitude (or attitudes). Q.E.D.
For example, again, Tony Wolk’s approach dates roughly from
John Locke in Philosophy and (O odious word) politics, from the Romantic idea of
"genius" in culture and literature, etc. In the 18th and early 19th
Century this was a helpful liberal and positivist defense against outworn
orthodoxies of a Boileau or Dr Johnson plugging ahistorical "eternal"
rules of how to write art. But Aristotle or Thomas of Aquinas would not have
understood what Mr Wolk means by "the critic imposing limits, boundaries
upon the artist," nor would too many major critics after positivism—except
those committed to making an imaginary lone and "free" individual and
final atom, building brick and touchstone of the physical and social universe.
Thus, Wolk is pleading for an approach which can fairly—and without swearwords
or sloganeering—be called romantic, positivist, liberal or individualistic.
That is, of course, his right. It is however to my mind not helpful to couch
such a plea in the usual liberal rhetorics of "freedom for the artist"
as against the "restrictions by the critics." Aristotle, Thomas of
Aquinas or, say, Bertolt Brecht—fairly strong personalities each—would
answer that the freedom of the artist lies in the unrepeatable personal creation
of an artistic work that reveals the necessities or the inner logic of Nature,
God’s Creation, or Collective Human History-Making and History-Suffering (you
take your pick—as a Marxist, I pick the third). The critic can, therefore,
only correctly or more or less incorrectly identify how and what a work of art,
in its own inimitable way, tells the readers that is of common import to each
and all of them—i.e. what it tells us all about the actualities and
possibilities of human relationships, in whatever playful way the artist has
fashioned for our delight while and in order that we envisage those new
relationships. In other words, the critic’s responsibility is not only to the
author but also to the present and future reader.
Specifically, through a long detour which I have tried to
explain in a number of lengthy essays and will no doubt be explaining further in
the future, this means: a) not that "SF is more viable than fantasy,"
but that the HIGHEST REACHES of SF can accommodate richer views of human
relationships than the HIGHEST REACHES of the fantasy genre (and we are dealing
with both in Le Guin’s case)—and I think that this is clear in the
juxtapositions of the Earthsea Trilogy, and, say, The Dispossessed, and
in the contamination of the two genres in The Lathe of Heaven; b) not
that "those works are best which most closely approach political anarchy
[anarchism?, DS]"—I am myself not an anarchist, nor is as far as I know
any other contributor to SFS #7, nor do I remember anybody arguing exactly that
way—but that the inner logic of Le Guin’s creation (or at least of one of
the two major tendencies of it, the other being—to affix a hasty term to it—the
introvert fantasy tendency, which collaborators to a journal called SCIENCE-FICTION
Studies have logically somewhat slighted) has from her very first efforts
been leading to The Dispossessed. It seems to me quite inevitable, as T.S.
Eliot argued in "Tradition and the Individual Talent," that each new
work in a sequence—such as the opus of an author —retroactively modifies
that whole sequence. Of course, Tony Wolk is right in saying that primitive
teleology (an early work is important ONLY INSOFAR as it leads to a better and
later one) does not always work, and insofar as any of us in the compression of
an article with limited time and space hastily said so, his is a welcome
corrective: for clearly, in a certain sense all the works written also exist
simultaneously while he simultaneously thinks of them. And it is equally true
that arguments to the effect that Le Guin’s whole creative evolution has no
logic to it would—unless they were particularly brilliant—tend to get
slighted in a special issue devoted to her. But all this does not necessarily
amount to a political straitjacket—at any rate not more so than the evolution
which Le Guin herself "imposed" on her work.
Now to Mr Eisentstein’s note. Le Guin’s footnote
indicating that her article was a talk held at a conference on Women in SF
indeed got lost somewhere between the final MS and the printed issue, a mistake
for which I apologized to her before seeing Mr Eisenstein’s letter (another
such mistake was the loss of item G17, her review in SFS #3, from Levin’s
bibliography), and I herewith apologize again publicly. Though I don’t really
want to get involved in debate about Mr Niven’s story, Le Guin’s answer is
both more gracious and more economical than mine would be. I think she quite
rightly felt the deep-seated blithe racism of the story, though that may be only
a by-product of its fundamental "I’m all right, Jack, screw you" Playboy-type
individualism run mad.
Finally, just two demurrals against the conclusion of
Professor Christianson’s informative article on Kepler. My basic disagreement
with it is its treating SF as fiction about the consequences of, or validated
by, astronomy and physics. Only from such a point of view can it be explained
that he misinterpreted Marjorie Nicolson’s statement about the Somnium
being the source and origin of cosmic voyages to its being such a fons
et origo of SF as a whole. And, what is more important, only from such a
point of view—which surely went out with John Campbell even in SF criticism?—can
the great Giordano Bruno be dismissed as a "religious mystic who soared
into the metaphysical realm unencumbered by the ballast of scientific
thinking"! On the contrary, Bruno was a great liberating and to my mind
quite non-metaphysical philosopher, much more important for ushering in a new
cosmology than either Galileo or Copernicus—or, of course, than Kepler. True,
his cognitions were not arrived at by mathematical calculations but by
philosophical reasoning with a good deal of poetical intuition. But it is, I
believe, an unacceptable view in modern important epistemology and philosophy of
science to define science only as that which can be quantified, and to deny the
role of intuition in hypothesis-framing reasoning. Among other consequences, we
would then have to kick out of SF three quarters of the works so far written
about in SFS: Le Guin, Dick, Aldiss, and what have you. Now I am surely against
obscurantist mingling of SF and fantasy, and I argued so at the beginning of
this article; hut I am equally as much against a narrow defining of science, and
therefore of SF. If the earthy and impassioned Bruno, burned by the Catholic
Church on Piazza del popolo, still one of the most beautiful squares in Rome, is
a mystic, then let us have more mystics—in science, SF, and SF criticism. —DS.
In Response to Professor Suvin.Darko
Suvin’s main objection to my article on Kepler’s Somnium has to do
with Note 26 in which I refer to Giordano Bruno as a "religious mystic who
soared into the metaphysical realm unencumbered by the ballast of scientific
thinking." Instead, Professor Suvin sees Bruno as a "quite non-metaphysical
philosopher, much more important for ushering in the a new cosmology than either
Galileo or Copernicus." I wonder, then, why the Church didn’t burn Bruno
for his heterodox cosmological views, which were not even mentioned at his
trial. Galileo, on the other hand, paid dearly for his support of Copernican
cosmology. Why? Because they went far beyond the bounds of mystical speculation!
And does Professor Suvin truly believe that more people read and were influenced
by Bruno’s Of the Infinite Universe and World than by Galileo’s Starry
Messenger? If so, I would like some proof. Galileo was the most famous
scientist of his day and may have been the most famous man in Europe during the
early 17th century.
No, I do not believe science to be "only that which can
he quantified," nor do I "deny the value of intuition in hypothesis-framing
reasoning." But of what ultimate value is an hypothesis unless it can be
tested? Indeed, the only reason Professor Suvin can advance his argument at all
is because Bruno, who was a Copernican, had his views mathematically
validated by other Copernicans who contributed far more to the popularization of
the new cosmology than he. Without the mathematization of intuitive hypotheses
there would be no "Le Guin, Dick, Aldiss, and what have you." There
would be no science fiction as we now know it. —Gale E. Christianson.
On the Age of the Term "Science Fiction." May
I ask the learned readership if they still imagine that Hugo Gernsback coined
the term "science fiction"? There reposes in the Bodleian a copy of
William Watson’s A Little Earnest Book upon a Great Old Subject,
published by Darton & Co. in 1851, the year of the Great Exhibition; the
copy remained unopened and unread until I had Chapter 10 xeroxed. Watson wrote:
"Campbell says that ‘Fiction in Poetry is not the reverse of truth, but
her soft and enchanting resemblance.’ Now this applied especially to Science-Fiction,
in which the revealed truths of Science may be given, interwoven with a pleasing
story which may itself be poetical and true...." A sensible prescription
for science fiction! Notice that this coinage comes less than a decade after the
date the OED gives for the first use (a deliberate coinage by Dr Whewell) of the
word "scientist." (Campbell? Well, yes, Thomas Campbell, presumably.) —Brian
W. Aldiss.
Documents in the History of Science Fiction.
Under this rubric SFS will in its next issue begin publishing a series of
prefaces, forewords, reviews. etc. of the 19th century or earlier, and of the
first half of the 20th century, that seem important for understanding the growth
and development of science fiction. Most important for our purposes would be
items that show an awareness of a type of fiction to which some such term as
"scientific fiction" might be applied, whether or not it is actually
applied in the item itself. The chapter quoted so opportunely by Mr Aldiss in
the preceding note would seem to be exactly what we are looking for. But we are
also interested in contemporary reviews of earlier SF works that are of interest
for their own sake. Any reader of SFS who is aware of such a
"document," or who comes across one, is urged to send a photocopy to
SFS, together with (if he or she so wishes) a brief preface and such annotations
as seem required. The prefacing and annotating could of course be done after the
document has been accepted for publication in SFS and/or the book which we
expect to ensue. —RDM.
A Prophet Honored in His Own Country. Lem’s
Solaris was voted by readers the most-read book in Poland in 1975 (NB:
the most-read book, not just the most popular SF novel). His volume of essays Rozprawy
i szkice won the annual award for criticism of the literary paper Zycie
literackie (15,000 Zloty). This volume in Lem’s "Selected Works"
(now nearly "complete works") includes two of his essays in SFS—the
afterword to Ubik and the essay on Todorov—and two other essays
pertinent to SF—an afterword to The War of the Worlds and an
introduction to Slonimski’s Torpeda Czasu (i.e. Torpedoes of Time). —Franz
Rottensteiner.
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